There is widespread concern about the quality of care in nursing homes. On the basis of administrative data of a large health insurance fund, we investigate whether nursing home prices are associated with relevant quality of care indicators at the resident level. Our results indicate negative associations between price and both inappropriate and psychotropic medication. In contrast, we do not find any relationship between the price and impairments of physical health.
regulated nursing home prices. Individuals have long-term care insurance coverage through their social health insurers, which collect routine data for reimbursement purposes. The resulting administrative databases combine individual-level information about health care and nursing services and thus provide an excellent opportunity to examine nursing home performance.
We add to the existing literature by using a rich dataset from Germany's largest sickness fund that enables us to carry out an arguably more nuanced analysis of the influence of prices on nursing service quality at the resident level. Further contributions to the literature are the use of more timely data and attempts to improve over cross-sectional models. In relation to the latter, we aim to (a) account for time-invariant resident heterogeneity by estimating fixed effects regressions 1 and (b) mitigate the risk of reverse causality through the use of price variation that stems from negotiations based largely on a comparison of historical costs for nursing home versus national averages and not on quality (in Section 2, we discuss our contribution to the literature in more detail).
The prices for in-patient services in nursing homes consist of the rate for nursing services, the fee for accommodation and catering, as well as investment costs. Negotiations commonly concern the reimbursement rate for a period of about 1 year and are carried out between the nursing home, the long-term care insurance fund, and the social assistance . The bargaining power of each party depends on many factors including local labor market variables and local levels of supply of nursing services. Bauer and Stroka (2013) as well as Mennicken, Augurzky, Rothgang, and Wasem (2014) explain differences in remuneration rates of nursing homes in Germany in more detail.
The argument for the hypothesized link between reimbursement rates and quality of provided care is that nursing homes are able to improve their nursing service through an increase in the quantity of well-trained staff and, hence effective nursing time per resident. 2 In fact, numbers of nurses per resident are larger in nursing homes with higher reimbursement rates (see, e.g., Grabowski, 2001b; Cohen & Spector, 1996) . It cannot, however, be taken for granted that increased nursing time yields better quality and even if this was the case, it is unclear whether the resulting quality differences would be noticeable (e.g., by health policy makers and persons directly concerned, i.e., cared individuals and their relatives).
Nursing homes with a lower reimbursement rate may be able to mask a potentially lower level of effective nursing time by the administration of relatively cheap sedative drugs (Hughes & Lapane, 2005) . 3 These drugs can reduce the extent of resident care needs and prevent adverse physical events through immobilization. Hence, they might be used as less visible substitutes for physical restraints whose application is frequently considered as bad quality (Park and Tang, 2007) . In fact, it is a long-lasting societal concern that nursing homes provide their residents with inappropriate medication and excessively administer psychotropic drugs (see, e.g., Beers et al., 1992; Pittrow et al., 2003; Ruths, Straand, & Nygaard, 2001; Waxman, Klein, & Carner, 1985) . The problem of strategically (over-) applying sedative drugs is that they have a negative effect on the quality of life and a deteriorating long-term impact on both mental and physical health (see, e.g., Bauer et al., 2012; Fincke, Miller, & Spiro, 1998; Harrington, Tompkins, Curtis, & Grant, 1992; Thapa, Gideon, Cost, Milam, & Ray, 1998 ). Yet, their application is seldom considered as bad quality by public authorities in Europe. 4 The reason is that many residents actually require them and, for quality inspectors, it is very difficult to identify residents whose need for psychotropic drugs may be reduced or even entirely avoided by adequate provision of care. Although German nursing homes are only allowed to apply psychoactive substances that were prescribed by the resident's physician, they have a relevant impact on a resident's medication by deciding on the frequency of doctor visits, selecting physicians, and providing information on the resident's mental and physical condition.
5 For German physicians, serving a nursing home usually is not a lucrative business (Gross, 2011) . In fact, they have an incentive to minimize time spent examining and talking with residents. Following the nursing home's medication policy arguably is an effective strategy to save time. For instance, they can reduce the length of patient consultations if they gather information on the residents' condition and (medical) needs from the nurses. 1 Because residents nearly never change the nursing home, these fixed effects also account for inherent differences across nursing homes. Hence, our econometric approach exploits variation in reimbursement rates that occur within the resident's nursing home over time.
2 Augurzky et al. (2008) actually observe that in German regions with higher nursing homes prices, residents are offered more social activities that aim to promote physical and mental fitness. In case of anxious residents, for instance, social activities may effectively calm down.
3 German nursing homes do not carry the costs for medication as they are paid by the health insurance fund (in the fast majority of cases) or the patient's themselves. 4 In the health services and medical literature, there are studies showing that nursing homes with higher reimbursements have fewer medication errors, lower medication costs as well as decreasing antipsychotic use (see, e.g., Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas, & Smith, 2003; Duffield et al., 2011; Hughes, Lapane, & Mor, 2000; Mark & Belyea, 2009 After an overview of the existing literature on this topic (Section 2), the paper describes the data source and the study population (Section 3), and discusses the empirical strategy (Section 4). Results are presented in Section 5, followed by a discussion of policy implications.
| LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION
Our study contributes to a large economic literature on the effect of reimbursements on the quality of formal care in the United States. Nyman (1988 Nyman ( , 1989 finds no evidence of a significant correlation between care quality (as measured by regulatory violations) in nursing homes and reimbursement rates, whereas Nyman (1985) and Gertler (1989 Gertler ( , 1992 show that higher reimbursements decrease the quality of care (considering violations and home expenditures on nursing service). Cohen and Spector (1996) as well as Grabowski (2001a) find rather mixed evidence: depending on the indicators used, nursing home reimbursement rates either significantly improve the quality of care or are immaterial for the provided quality.
7 Considering staffing levels and output-oriented quality measures, including pressure ulcers and physical restraints, more recent studies of Grabowski and coauthors report "small" positive effects of reimbursement rates on the quality of formal care (Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski, 2004; Grabowski, Angelelli, & Mor, 2004; . Similarly, Herr and Hottenrott (2016) report moderate effects. Only Konetzka, Norton, and Stearns (2006) find "large" positive effects of reimbursement rates on the quality of formal care (considering pressure sores and urinary tract infections). We improve upon this literature in various ways. First, although much of the existing literature criticizes the medication standards in nursing homes (see, e.g., Avorn, Dreyer, Connelly, & Soumerai, 1989 , Avorn et al., 1992 Beers et al., 1992; Ruths et al., 2001; Stroka, 2013; Waxman et al., 1985) , no study in the economic literature so far has examined the link between nursing home prices and medication practices differentiated by certain drug classes at the individual level of nursing home residents.
8 If nursing homes are actually able to mask quality shortcomings by the application of such drugs, previous studies have probably underestimated the effect of reimbursement rates. Second, except the studies of Konetzka et al. (2006) and Cohen and Spector (1996) , all papers are based on facility level data. Our detailed resident level data enable us to control for relevant individual characteristics to prevent that observed effects erroneously capture differences in the mixture of residents with certain diseases. They furthermore allow the use of outcomebased quality measures on the resident level that help us to prevent that we confound efficiency with bad quality. Facility level analysis commonly rely on input-oriented facility level quality indicators such as the shares of professional and nonprofessional staff, which make it difficult to disentangle whether low input levels reflect quality shortcomings or a better efficiency in the provision of care. However, this distinction is essential because neither in the United States nor in Germany nursing home prices are established on a competitive market, wherefore quality of care might be low regardless of the relative price .
Third, this is one of the very few panel data analyses (the data cover the years 2007-2009). Except two other studies (Grabowski, 2004; Konetzka et al., 2006) , all relevant studies are based on cross-sectional data. Panel data methods allow us to difference out time-invariant heterogeneity, which otherwise may bias the results. Our identification strategy is based on fixed effects models that were previously employed only by Grabowski (2004) who uses relatively old data.
Fourth, in contrast to previous resident-level studies, all records in our data are of administrative nature, whose advantages relative to survey data are coverage and completeness of information. Moreover, data reliability is relatively high because most resident level records are reported by experts such as physicians. This is important because home residents are often senile people who suffer from several severe diseases. Their relatives may not dispose of all relevant information. Hence, routine data are very suitable for performance comparisons across health care providers (Smith & Street, 2013) . 7 Cohen and Spector (1996) find significant results for staffing intensity and insignificant results considering the home residents' functional status, bedsores, and probability to die. Grabowski (2001a) finds significantly positive effects regarding professional staffing and insignificant results for nonprofessional staffing and quality as measured by the medication error rate and use of feeding tubes, catheters, as well as physical restraints. 8 A first attempt to consider medication as a possible quality measure was made by Grabowski (2001a) . However, his quality measure (the facility level medication error rate, which summarizes information from a nursing home survey on the compliance with a selected number of medication guidelines) suffers from aggregation bias. Hence, we argue that it approximates medication quality much worse compared to our detailed individual level information on doses of prescribed drugs. Moreover, medication in general and especially antipsychotic medication was used as a quality measure in some medical and health services research (see, e.g., Avorn et al., 1989; Bergman, 2007; Castle, 2001; Castle & Engberg, 2005; Chen et al., 2010; Dwyer, Han, Woodwell, & Rechtsteiner Fifth, we are among the first to report association between nursing home reimbursement rates and the quality of care for another country than the United States. 9 Thus, we are able to assess the extent to which findings for the United States are transferable to other countries such as Germany. We expect considerable heterogeneity in the effects across countries because nursing home markets largely differ in their structure and regulatory framework. The paper also relates to another strain of the literature, which addresses the response of health care providers to financial incentives. There is abundant evidence that providers actually adjust their treatment practices to incentives and, thereby, adjustments affect the provided quality of care in different respects (see, e.g., Gilman, 2000; Grant, 2009; Hensen et al., 2008; Kaestner & Guardado, 2008; Liu, Yang, & Hsieh, 2009; Schmitz, 2013; Yip, 1998) .
| DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our analysis is based on data from two different sources. The main source is a resident-level administrative data set provided by Techniker Krankenkasse. Among others, it includes detailed information on personal characteristics, ascertained International Classification of Diseases 10 diagnoses, and the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical code together with the daily defined doses (DDDs) of prescribed drugs.
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These data are merged to information on nursing home reimbursements (i.e., the rate for nursing services, the fee for accommodation and catering, as well as the investment costs) obtained from the Association of Health Insurance Companies.
Our analysis is restricted to individuals in nursing homes aged 65 years and older, who are officially considered to be in need of care and assigned to one of three care levels by the independent Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds.
11 The data comprise 13,981 person/year observations, resulting from 7,221 individuals observed over up to three periods (2007) (2008) (2009) .
As outcome variables, we use the DDDs of seven drug types prescribed in the course of 1 year, including drugs from the Priscus-list, psychotropic medication (antipsychotics, antidepressants, hypnotics and sedatives as well as anxiolytics), analgesics, and the total sum of DDDs of all prescribed drugs. The Priscus-list is an official register of potentially inappropriate medication for frail elderly people in Germany (Holt, Schmiedl, & Thürmann, 2010 ) that resembles similar international lists such as the Beers-list (Beers, 1997) . The list identifies medical drugs that pose potential risks (including harmful side effects that may be life-threatening and other adverse drug events) that outweigh potential benefits for people 65 years and older. The use of such inappropriate medication is associated with a high risk of adverse health outcomes especially in the elderly living in nursing homes (Perri et al., 2005) .
Besides the drugs from the Priscus-list, we analyse psychotropic medication. The literature considers psychotropic drugs as the most commonly misused or overprescribed drugs by physicians in nursing homes, leading to many potential adverse health risks of the elderly (see, e.g., Bauer et al., 2012; Harrington et al., 1992; Montamat & Cusack, 1992; Shah, 2000; Waxman et al., 1985; Yip & Cumming, 1994) . In addition, we concentrate on drugs that provide us with information on the physical condition of residents. Analgesics serve as a proxy for both general physical condition and, specifically, pressure ulcers (Twillman, Long, Cathers, & Mueller, 1999) , as well as for other external sufferings. Hence, analgesics consumption may be regarded as a direct measure of the quality of care. We also consider the overall medication in order to obtain further interesting insights into drug prescriptions in nursing homes. This variable may reveal whether associations between prices and medication are not specific to certain drugs.
Higher prescriptions of drugs are not per se bad for health, especially for people with related diseases. We nevertheless interpret a negative effect of reimbursement rates on the prescribed amount of drugs as indication for a better quality of care because (a) levels of drug prescriptions are, in general, already excessively high in nursing homes, 12 (b) misuse of medications in nursing homes is frequently reported (Dowideit, 2012) , and (c) it is well known that polypharmacy and high drug doses exert detrimental effects on morbidity and mortality in elderly (see, e.g., Hajjar, Cafiero, & Hanlon, 2007; Routledge, O'Mahony, & 9 A recent study examines the relationship between prices and quality based on a cross section of public quality reports for all German nursing homes. It estimates two-stage least squares regressions, exploiting local variation in physician density, green environment, and income levels to instrument for nursing home prices (Herr & Hottenrott, 2016) . 10 As shown by Schmitz and Stroka (2013b) , these kind of administrative data are very representative concerning health outcomes.
11 Although care level 1 goes along with nursing needs of, on average, at least 90 min per day, care levels 2 and 3 include at least 180 and 300 min of daily nursing needs, respectively.
12 It is well documented that prescription rates of the considered drugs are already on a very high level, indicating over-medication in nursing homes (see, e.g., Waxman et al., 1985) . In fact, controlling for a long list of diseases, previous studies have shown that drug consumption by German nursing home residents is much higher than by non-institutionalized care recipients (see, e.g., Stroka, 2013 Woodhouse, 2004; Ziere et al., 2006) . Note that the inclusion of a large set of health outcomes such as indicators for mental diseases as covariates into the econometric model enables us to take into account that the considered medication is not per se bad but can be even warranted for individuals with certain diseases such as the consumption of antipsychotics in case of depressions and bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, schizotypal, and delusional disorders. 
where P ict denotes institution's i price for nursing services of a certain care level c in year t; S ct the share of a certain care level c over all institutions in year t; C it the fee for accommodation and catering of institution i in year t; and I it the investment costs of institution i in year t.
Reimbursement rates vary between nursing homes due to regional reasons (e.g., different loan levels, prices of land, etc.). Variation over time is attributable to changes in the demand for inpatient care as well as conditions of loans and other cost factors. Nursing home reiumbursement rates are prospectively negotiated for about 1 year between the service provider, the social assistance, and the long-term care insurance fund. The latter pays a nationwide fixed amount per month, depending on the severity of care, and the residents -their relatives or social aid -bear the rest of the costs.
17 If a nursing home does not agree with the result of the price negotiations, it has the possibility to veto the price. In such cases, an arbitral court takes a decision. Yet, these court decisions take about 1 year. In the meantime, the nursing home bears the risk of carrying costs not recovered through prices. Thus, nursing homes rarely challenge negotiation outcomes in the arbitral court. A series of resident level variables, such as gender, age, care level, and various dummy variables indicating different types of diseases are included as controls in the regression analysis. The latter jointly capture individual morbidity. Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the variables used in the analysis. Table 1 (Column 1) displays descriptive statistics for our study population. Overall, we observe that the amounts of prescribed drugs are very high in nursing homes of both price classes. The prescribed amount of DDDs of antidepressants, for instance, is about eight times higher compared to the average dose consumed by adult individuals in Germany (OECD, 2009) . Prima facie evidence on the relationship between applied drugs in nursing homes and reimbursement rates is displayed in Columns 2 and 3 of the table, which present the means of the outcome variables for nursing homes with prices below and prices above the average price. We observe statistically significant higher DDDs of antipsychotics in nursing homes with above average reimbursement rates compared to homes with a reimbursement below the average rate. We do not observe this pattern for other quality measures. In contrast, nursing homes with above average prices have higher prescribed DDDs of anxiolytics than nursing homes with a below average rate. Hence, a simple comparison of means of the outcome variables yields ambiguous results. Note. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definition of variables.
*t test for difference in means significant at 5% level.
As to other variables available in the dataset, the comparison between nursing homes with below average and above average reimbursement rates reveals statistically significant differences. There are more women, older residents, and residents with a worse care level in higher priced nursing homes. Residents in homes with above average reimbursement rates are also significantly more (less) likely to be diagnosed with depression and a bipolar disorder (stroke). The total number of resident places is higher, and the likelihood to be located in Eastern Germany is lower in nursing homes with reimbursement rates above the average.
More detailed descriptive statistics on the main variables are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The last row of the table shows both a high variation of reimbursements between institutions and across time. Although the lowest reimbursement rate equals less than EUR 40, the highest rate is above EUR 220, that is, more than 400% higher. Moreover, the yearly increase of the average reimbursements equals about 1-2%.
| EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
For each of the eight quality measures Y jit (doses of drugs from the Priscus-list, antipsychotics, antidepressants, tranquilizers, anxiolytics, analgesics, all consumed drugs, and adverse physical events), we perform regression analyses with facility-level characteristics X it , including the reimbursement rate and a large set of individual-level variables Z jit as control variables. The vector Z jit consists mostly of variables that describe the health status of the resident.
We estimate the following regression equation:
Subscript j denotes the individual, i the nursing home and t the year, ε represents a random error term, and time-invariant factors are captured by λ, and the β's are coefficients subject to estimation. We estimate pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects regressions.
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The fixed effects are modelled at the resident level for two reasons. First, they control for any time-invariant individual characteristics that may be simultaneously correlated with the quality measures and the nursing home price, that is, mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias. For instance, myopic individuals may be more likely to reside in nursing homes with a low reimbursement rate and, at the same time, have a lower pain tolerance. Second, they also account for inherent differences across nursing homes because residents nearly never change the nursing home.
19 Importantly, this implies that we exploit variation in reimbursement rates that occur within the resident's nursing home over time. This is more conservative than nursing home fixed effects. An significant association found for the reimbursement rate in these regressions is arguably difficult to attribute to reverse causality because prices are prospectively set in negotiations between nursing home owners and the sponsors (i.e., representatives of the long-term care insurance and the social assistance office) for about 1 year. Moreover, quality aspects play only a secondary role during these negotiations, which mostly concentrate on the comparison of disclosed costs with national average costs. Hence, contemporaneous values in the outcome variables are unlikely to be associated with reimbursement rates. This argumentation is in line with results from a fixed effects regression of the nursing home price on the lagged quality outcomes, which does not yield significant associations in most cases (Table A3 in the Appendix). 20 Moreover, the hypothesis of joint significance of the historical quality measures is rejected. However, we cannot rule out time-variant unobservable factors that are correlated with the price and the residents' outcomes. A positive change in the nursing home management, for instance, may cause higher reimbursement rates due to more successful negotiations and, at the same time, better care through process restructuring. We therefore consider our results as associations.
| RESULTS
This section presents the results from empirical models that relate the level of reimbursement rates to prescribed medication and adverse physical events. We present results in Table 2 , displaying the effect of the reimbursement rate on each of the employed quality indicators. Results for the control variables are presented in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
With the exception of the significantly positive coefficient of reimbursement rates in the regression concerning overall medication, we find insignificant relationships between reimbursement rates and each individual drug category and adverse physical events in the pooled OLS model (Column 1). Once we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, results considerably change.
In the fixed effects model (Column 2), we find that an increase in the reimbursement rate goes along with a statistically significant decrease in the prescribed doses of Priscus-listed drugs, antipsychotics, hypnotics and sedatives, as well as the overall prescribed dose of drugs. An increase of the reimbursement rate of EUR 1 goes along with a decrease of 1.0, 0.4, 0.5, and 8.1 DDDs of inappropriate drugs, antipsychotics, hypnotics, and overall medication, respectively. In terms of elasticity (as shown in Table 3 for a better comparability of the results from different estimation methods), a 1% increase in the reimbursement rate is associated with a 1.6%, 1.1%, 2.8%, and 0.5% decrease in respective doses. Our results can be considered as evidence for a reduced application of inappropriate and psychotropic drugs in nursing homes with higher reimbursements rates. In line with our previous argumentation, our finding of a statistically insignificant coefficient of the reimbursement rate on injuries or poisoning can be seen as an indication for less costly nursing homes compensating for the underprovision of care with the application of psychoactive substances.
We find qualitatively similar results for a series of variations to our econometric model. (a) We added an interaction term between the reimbursements with the binary indicator for East Germany in the pooled ordinary least squares estimation (Table A6 in 21 (e) We used the actual nursing home price paid by individuals instead of the average nursing home price. Results for (b-e) are available upon request. 22 Eventually, we present estimation results for a two-part model (including a trimmed model) in Section A2 of the Appendix (Tables A8-A10) . 21 The treatment of these diseases goes along with the use of antipsychotics (see, e.g., Wang & Si, 2013) . 22 We further replaced resident fixed effects with nursing-home fixed effects (Table A7 in the Appendix). Although a significantly negative effect of the reimbursement rate on antipsychotics is confirmed, the previously significant coefficients for the other quality measures turn insignificant (and a significantly positive effect on analgesics emerges). The difference between these results and the ones from our preferred model specification indicates that unobserved variables at the individual level are correlated with changes in the reimbursement rate. For instance, myopic individuals may be more likely to reside in nursing homes with initially low prices that increase over time. Different N depending on outcome variables: Priscus-list = 5,345; Antipsychotics = 6,220; Antidepressants = 4,625; Hypnotics and sedatives = 1,881; Anxiolytics = 2,285; Analgesics = 7,286; Injuries and poisoning = 4,219. *Significant at 5% level. Standard errors clustered at the nursing home level.
| CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the literature on the quality of care provided by nursing homes. It presents associations between reimbursement rates and eight separate measures of care outcomes in German nursing homes. Our quality indicators include prescriptions of potentially inappropriate medication, sedatives, medication related to physical health, and the incidence of injuries or poisoning. Rather than relying on facility-level measures, which may not be suitable to satisfactorily establish the empirical relationship between reimbursements and quality of care, we use rich and detailed resident-level data.
The preferred fixed effects model yields mixed evidence regarding the association between reimbursement rates and quality of provided care. On the one hand, reimbursements have an insignificant effect on the number of injuries and poisoning as well as on antidepressants and anxiolytics. On the other hand, we find that higher reimbursement rates are associated with a lower daily defined doses of inappropriate (Priscus-listed) drugs, antipsychotics, hypnotics, and sedatives as well as fewer drugs overall.
Effects are primarily found for care outcomes that are relatively difficult to associate with low quality (we call them "hard identifiable" care outcomes). In line with most previous studies, we do not find an effect on visible impairments of physical health. We interpret this finding as a first hint for less costly nursing homes compensating for the underprovision of care with the application of psychoactive substances.
In terms of effect size, elasticities ranges from 0.5% (overall medication) to 2.8% (hypnotic drugs and sedatives). Considering an average monthly reimbursement rate of EUR 90 and a mean of 16 daily defined doses of hypnotics and sedatives per year in our sample, the latter elasticity implies an increase of almost a half of a daily dose per year in response to a raise in the monthly reimbursement rate of EUR 0.9. The available data limits our ability to draw conclusions about the medical significance of this finding. However, because medication levels in nursing homes are generally considered as very high in Germany, the nexus between prices and medication seems to deserve further attention. Subsequent research should move beyond associations and explore causal channels that may lead to these associations.
Important policy implications may arise if our results of improved quality of care in response to increasing reimbursement rates were to be confirmed. We see a potential for quality improvements (with respect to medication) by taking into consideration potentially inappropriate and psychotropic medication in quality inspections. German home inspections currently concentrate on "easy identifiable" outcome quality measures such as the incidence of pressure ulcers. Also, the long-term care insurance is able to cancel the contract with a nursing home in case of fatal quality deficits (Roth, 2002) . A high-quality elasticity of demand of individuals who require formal care for the first time may provide financial incentives to nursing homes that are criticized for underproviding their residents with care. 23 Hence, the inclusion of nuanced medical quality criteria into quality reports could go along with quality improvements. In fact, with the introduction of quality report cards in 2009, the German government successfully undertook attempts to improve the quality of nursing homes through quality disclosure as suggested by a recent study (Herr, Nguyen, & Schmitz, 2016) . Similarly, our finding of associations between quality of care and prices indicates the possibility to improve nursing service performance by increasing nursing home funding. An option may be nursing care reforms that focus on the establishment of market prices in combination with strict regulatory assurance of critical levels of care quality. Rewarding nursing homes for quality of care may diversify the care sector. In Germany, nursing home residents (and their relatives) are currently mostly excluded from reimbursement rate negotiations. One way could be to strengthen the role of nursing home residents in these negotiations.
